DAVID BOHM WAS among the most promising students of his generation when he took his degree in 1943. He got a position at Princeton, did research on plasma theory, and published a well received graduate textbook entitled Quantum theory. But in 1951, his life suffered two important changes. He became a victim of McCarthyʼs anticommunist hysteria and he changed his research focus to a causal interpretation of quantum mechanics. Those two changes were a turning point in his personal and scientifi c life. In the McCarthy period, Bohm could not survive in American academia. He obtained a position in Brazil, but did not enjoy it there. However, having had his passport confi scated by American offi cials, it was as a Brazilian citizen that he left Brazil in January 1955 to take a position at the Technion in Haifa. Two years later he went to England, where he fi nally found a convenient place to pursue his research for the rest of his prolonged exile. His main scientifi c interests remained in the unorthodox subject he began to work on in 1951, but from 1970 on he shifted his approach to what he called "implicit order."
FREIRE
Physicists did not like Bohmʼs causal interpretation and some were downright hostile. Both the vicissitudes of Bohmʼs life and the adverse initial reception of his causal interpretation have attracted the attention of historians, philosophers, and physicists, and some of them have blamed the former for the latter. "The political atmosphere in the U.S. at that time did not help rational debate and in consequence there was little discussion and the interpretation was generally ignored for reasons that had more to do with politics than science," according to Bohmʼs assistant, Basil Hiley. F. David Peat, a science writer and former Bohm collaborator, also found the political explanation for Bohmʼs unfavorable reception appealing, but limited its force to the Princeton physics community. The historians Russel Olwell and Shawn Mullet blamed Bohmʼs Brazilian exile for the poor reception of his causal interpretation. 2 The case has attracted some interest, probably because beginning in the early 1970s the interpretation and foundations of quantum mechanics became a fi eld of intensive research. "Bohmian mechanics" attracted some of the researchers in the 1990s; and by the end of the century, Bohm was considered one of the most gifted protagonists in the fi eld of research he had helped to create. A sign of his new prestige can be found in the volume honoring the centenary of the Physical review, which includes commentaries on and reprints from the most important papers ever published in the leading journal of American physics. One chapter is dedicated to papers, including Bohm on the causal interpretation, that concern foundations of quantum mechanics. A photo of Bohm opens the chapter. 3 In order to explain the poor initial reception of Bohmʼs physical ideas, and his Brazilian exile, it is evidently necessary to look not only to his political problems, but also to the status of research into the foundations of quantum mechanics. By The red scare as the hidden variable in the Bohmian interpretation of quantum theory" (Senior thesis HIS679, University of Texas at Austin, unpub. paper, 1999). Mullet, after contact with sources about Bohmʼs stay in Brazil, has changed his views; cf. Shawn Mullet, "Creativity and the mainstream: David Bohmʼs migration to Brazil and the hidden variables interpretation," unpublished paper, Workshop on "Migrant scientists in the twentieth century" (Milan, 2003) . 3. Olival Freire Jr., "The historical roots of ʻfoundations of physicsʼ as fi eld of research ," Foundations of physics, 34 (2004) , 1741-1760. See the evolution of the number of citations of Bohmʼs original paper on causal interpretation, a graphics based on Fabio Freitas and Olival Freire Jr., "Sobre o uso da web of science como fonte para a história da ciência," Revista da SBHC, 1 (2003), 129-147. For a discussion of "Bohmian mechanics," James Cushing, Arthur Fine, and Sheldon Goldstein, eds., Bohmian mechanics and quantum theory: An appraisal (Dordrecht, 1996) . Henry Stroke, ed., The Physical review: The fi rst hundred years-a selection of seminal papers and commentaries (New York, 1995) . status I mean both the role played by the standard interpretation (complementarity), and the place of foundations of quantum mechanics in research agendas and teaching duties. In putting scientifi c ideas in their cultural contexts I neither juxtapose them nor fi nd strong causal links between them; as remarked by Peter Galison and Andrew Warwick, "understanding science as a cultural activity…means learning to identify and to interpret the complicated and particular collection of shared actions, values, signs, beliefs and practices by which groups of scientists make sense of their daily lives and work." They also noted that, "this kind of approach has already been widely applied to the history of the experimental sciences, but the literature on the theoretical side is much less developed." No connections between theories and experiments related to the foundations of quantum mechanics had been made in the early 1950s; we need therefore to understand the reception of a theoretical approach in a context lacking experimental links. The suggested approach of science as a cultural activity calls attention to the role of pedagogy in the production of science. 4 I begin by showing that Bohm found support in Brazil for his research program. The evidence adduced also contributes to fi lling a gap pointed out by Alexis De Greiff and David Kaiser; the construction of knowledge outside the leading centers of calculation and, consequently, of the globalization of knowledge, remains woefully understudied."
5 Bohm continued to work consistently on the causal interpretation, kept in contact with colleagues abroad, discussed his proposal with visitors from Europe and the United States, and profi tted from collaboration with Brazilian physicists in achieving some of the published results on the causal interpretation. Bohmʼs activities in Brazil did not match the views he expressed in the letters he wrote at the time, which refl ected his personality and personnel problems. Bohm would have faced elsewhere many of the obstacles that he faced in Brazil while working on a causal interpretation. The second part of the paper focuses on the dispute between supporters of causal and complementarity interpretations. Bohmʼs proposal represented the fi rst alternative to complementarity, and for this reason was seen as a major challenge. Supporters of complementarity succeeded in characterizing the dispute as philosophical, that is, not suitable for professional physicists. The fact that Bohm and his collaborators did not get any new results both infl uenced, and was infl uenced by, the characterization of foundations as philosophy.
David Bohm and his supporters challenged what Max Jammer called the "almost unchallenged monocracy of the Copenhagen school in the philosophy of 4 FREIRE quantum mechanics." 6 I will discuss the possible meanings and implications of Jammerʼs characterization. Additionally, I will sketch two comparative essays, one as description of the role of the McCarthyist climate in different contexts, the other a comparision of the reception of Bohmʼs causal interpretation with that of the interpretation suggested by Hugh Everett in the late 1950s.
BRAZILIAN EXILE

Settling in
In 1951 the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) subpoenaed Bohm to talk about his activities and links with the Communist Party during the war at the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. He claimed the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. He was indicted by a jury for contempt of Congress, arrested, freed on bail, and eventually acquitted on May 31, 1951. In this acquittal, Bohm profi tted from a decision of the Supreme Court reasserting the Fifth Amendment for people testifying before congressional committees. However, his personal damages were irreversible. At the beginning of the trial, Princeton University placed him on paid leave and did not reappoint him. Princetonʼs decision still stirs up controversy. John Archibald Wheeler wrote in his autobiography, after mentioning that he had invited Bohm to Princeton: "since the Bohm affair-which understandably polarized the campus-occurred while I was away, I played no part in it. Had I been there, Iʼm not sure I would have been outspoken in Bohmʼs defense….The university was gauche in its manner of dealing with Bohm, yet I could sympathize with its goal, to preserve its reputation as a center of unbiased scholarly inquiry, not the home of blind loyalty to one ideology or another." 7 Bohm began to look for a position abroad. He tried in Manchester, 8 with the support of Albert Einstein, to whom he had become close while owing to their discussions of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Manchester did not hire him. Brazil then entered the picture. Princeton had graduated a small group of Brazilian physicists and had become a meeting place for them (fi gure 1 Bohm went to Brazil an innocent and, as soon as he arrived, he wrote optimistically to Einstein, "The university is rather disorganized, but this will cause no trouble in the study of theoretical physics. There are several good students here, with whom it will be good to work." Later, however, he expressed considerable disatisfaction: "The country here is very poor and not as advanced technically as the U.S., nor is it as clean." "I am afraid that Brazil and I can never agree." Bohm arrived in Brazil on October 10, 1951. One month later American offi cials confi scated his passport and told him that he could only retrieve it to return to his native country. 13 Bohm wrote Einstein, "Now what alarms me about this is that I do not know what it means. The best possible interpretation is that they simply do not want me to leave Brazil, and the worst is that they are planning to carry me back because perhaps they are reopening this whole dirty business again. The uncertainty is certainly very disturbing, as it makes planning for the next few years very diffi cult."
14 Bohmʼs stay in Brazil, without a passport, changed his mood; he wrote to Melba Phillips: "Ever since I lost the passport, I have been depressed and uneasy, particularly since I was counting very much on [a] trip to Europe as an antidote to all the problems that I have mentioned."
15 Bohmʼs response to the confi scation of his passport was to seek Brazilian citizenship. 16 The University of São Paulo (USP), founded in 1934, was a testament to the power of the regional elite, who sought cultural hegemony after the defeat of the state of São Paulo in the 1932 rebellion.
17 When Bohm emigrated, Brazil was experiencing a new democracy that arose from the anti-dictatorial struggle of the Brazilian people and from their participation in World War II on the Allied side.
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Bohmʼs double identity as Marxist and Jew was not unfavorable in Brazil; on the contrary, it probably garnered him support. The fragile Brazilian democracy initially legalized the Communist Party, but later banned it. Communists continued to play a role in Brazilian life, for example, the writers Jorge Amado and Graciliano Ramos, the painter Cândido Portinari, the historian Caio Prado Jr., the physicist Mário Schönberg, and the architect Oscar Niemeyer. Brazil had been a terre dʼaccueil for Jews since the beginning of the 20 th century. An important literary recognition of this tolerance came from the Austrian Jew Stefan Zweig, who suggested in 1941 that Brazil could be a land of the future to Jews persecuted in Europe. The social and economic conditions associated with the exceptional phase of development in the metropolitan area of São Paulo were favorable to the integration of the Jewish community before and after World War II. The picture was not entirely rosy. Anti-Semitic features existed in the nationalist politics of the dictatorial regime of the "Estado Novo" (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) ; and the weakness of anti-Semitic feelings in Brazil did not extend to racial democracy for Brazilians of African descent.
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One of the most gifted Brazilian physicists, Mario Schönberg, a member of the Physics Department that hired Bohm, was a Jew who had represented the Communist Party in the state parliament after World War II. Schönberg had not had plain sailing. He was arrested in 1948 for his Communist affi liation. Nonetheless, despite the arrests of political activists and the closing of unions and the Communist Party, Communist intellectuals, like Schönberg, kept their positions at the universities. This could not have happened 20 years later, during the military dictatorship , when Schönberg was arrested and obliged to retire by presidential decree. Forced retirement also ended, sometimes only temporarily, the careers of physicists Tiomno, and Leite Lopes, the sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso (who would become President of Brazil), and the economist Celso Furtado.
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Bohmʼs interpretation of quantum mechanics
Bohm depicted quantum systems, such as electrons, as particles with well defi ned positions, and associated them with a function of the form ψ = R exp (iS/ h). Applying the Schrödinger equation to this function and exploiting analogies between the resulting equations and the Hamilton-Jacobi equation of classical mechanics, he showed that the electrons could have a well defi ned momentum p = ∇S(x). In addition, the electrons suffer the action of a "quantum potential" U(x) = -ħ 2 ∇ 2 R/2mR in addition to the potentials known from classical physics. In this model, P = ψ(x) 2 gives the probability density of a statistical ensemble of particle positions. Bohmʼs electrons have well defi ned positions as well as momenta; thus, they have continuous and well defi ned trajectories. These pʼs and xʼs are the hidden variables in Bohmʼs models. He developed them by ascribing well defi ned posi- Bohmʼs results agreed with the usual quantum mechanics for non-relativistic situations. He departed from complementarity, or the "usual interpretation" as he called it, in its essential assumption, "that the most complete possible specifi cation of an individual system is in terms of a wave function that determines only probable results of actual measurement processes." In addition, he expected that some assumptions of his models could be relaxed, permitting predictions different from quantum mechanics in domains in which it was facing diffi culties, such as the myriad new "fundamental" particles and the infi nities in quantum electrodynamics. According to Bohm, "the usual mathematical formulation seems to lead to insoluble diffi culties when it is extrapolated into the domain of distances of the order of 10 -13 cm or less. It is therefore entirely possible that the interpretation suggested here may be needed for the resolution of these diffi culties." Bohm knew that his quantum potential exhibited strange features, such as the instantaneous propagation of interactions in systems with many bodies. However, he hoped to remove the blemish in a future relativistic generalization of his models.
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Before Bohmʼs papers appeared in print, Einstein and Pauli informed him that Louis de Broglie had suggested a similar approach in 1927, which Bohm had not known. Pauli had criticized de Broglieʼs approach when fi rst proposed; under his and other criticism, de Broglie had given up his idea; and now Bohm had to face the same objections. Pauli had argued that de Broglieʼs proposal fi tted Max Bornʼs probabilistic interpretation of the ψ function only for elastic collisions. In the case of inelastic scattering of particles by a rotator, a problem Enrico Fermi had solved in 1926, de Broglieʼs idea was incompatible with assigning the rotator stationary states before and after the scattering. Pauli had considered this failure intrinsic to de Broglieʼs picture of particles with defi nite trajectories in space-time. 23 Pauli addressed his criticisms to a draft version of Bohm corrected in consequence. This draft has not survived, but an indication of the corrections has. In response to Pauliʼs criticisms Bohm wrote: "I hope that this new copy will answer some of the objections to my previous manuscript…. criticisms…I believe that they were based on the excessively abstract assumptions of a plane wave of infi nite extent for the electronsʼ Ψ function. As I point out in section 7 of paper I, if you had chosen an incident wave packet instead, then after the collision is over, the electron ends up in one of the outgoing wave packets, so that a stationary state is once more obtained." Pauli did not read the second manuscript as he considered it too long. Bohm: "If I write a paper so ʻshortʼ that you will read it, then I cannot answer all of your objections. If I answer all of your objections, then the paper will be too ʻlongʼ for you to read. I really think that it is your duty to read these papers carefully."
As a precaution, he summarized his views and the improvements in letters: 24 In the second version of the paper, these objections are all answered in detail. The second version differs considerably from the fi rst version. In particular, in the second version, I do not need to use "molecular chaos." You refer to this interpretation as de Broglieʼs. It is true that he suggested it fi rst, but he gave it up because he came to the erroneous conclusion that it does not work. The essential new point that I have added is to show in detail (especially by working out the theory of measurement in paper II) that his interpretation leads to all of the results of the usual interpretation. Section 7 of paper I is also new [transitions between stationary states -the Franck-Hertz experiment], and gives a similar treatment to the more restricted problem of the interaction of two particles, showing that after the interaction is over, the hydrogen atom is left in a defi nite "quantum state" while the outgoing scattered particle has a corresponding defi nite value for its energy.
Eventually, Pauli studied Bohmʼs papers as well as the letters. Pauli conceded that Bohmʼs model was logically consistent: "I do not see any longer the possibility of any logical contradiction as long as your results agree completely with those of the usual wave mechanics and as long as no means is given to measure the values of your hidden parameters both in the measuring apparatus and in the observed system." Pauli ended with a challenge: "as far as the whole matter stands now, your ʻextra wave-mechanical predictionsʼ are still a check, which cannot be cashed." Pauli never ceased to oppose the hidden variable interpretation. For Bohm, however, Pauliʼs challenge was less pressing than de Broglieʼs. 25 Louis de Broglie had had the idea of a "double solution," in which the waves of the Schrödinger equation pilot the particles, which are singularities of the waves. Just before the meeting of the Solvay council in October 24-29, 1927 he gave up this idea because of its mathematical diffi culties and presented his report to the meeting with just the "pilot wave." The particles were reduced to objects external to the theory. After the 1927 meeting he adhered to the complementarity interpretation. Bohm was right in remarking that de Broglie had not carried his ideas to a logical conclusion, but de Broglie surely had a share in the idea of hidden variables in quantum mechanics. Bohm resisted accepting it. To Pauli he suggested this interesting analogy: "If one man fi nds a diamond and then throws it away because he falsely concludes that it is a valueless stone, and if this stone is later found by another man who recognize its true value, would you not say that the stone belongs to the second man? I think the same applies to this interpretation of the quantum theory.
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Eventually Bohm adopted a diplomatic way, suggested by Pauli, to recognize de Broglieʼs priority while maintaining the superiority of his own work: "I have changed the introduction of my paper so as to give due credit to de Broglie, and have stated that he gave up the theory too soon (as suggested in your letter)." In addition to changing the introduction, he added "a discussion of interpretations of the quantum theory proposed by de Broglie and Rosen" and rebutted Pauliʼs criticisms. By the time Bohmʼs papers appeared in print, de Broglie was returning to his old approach together with his assistant Jean-Pierre Vigier. They would become the most important of Bohmʼs allies in the hidden-variable campaign.
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Reception of the interpretation
Historians have not rated Bohmʼs work in Brazil very highly. Jessica Wang wrote that McCarthyism forced him to give up research for several years. Later, she slightly modifi ed her views: "Unhappy with the quality of intellectual life at the University of São Paolo [sic] and beset with physical ailments, Bohm searched for a way out." Russell Olwell recognized that "Bohm continued to work on questions of theoretical physics," but added incorrectly "in isolation." Correctly taking into account the level of experimental physics in Brazil, Olwell wrote that "the Brazilian physics community lacked the kind of tools Bohm had used as a graduate student in experimental physics." But he did not consider that, since before leaving the United States, Bohm had been dedicated to the problem of the foundations of quantum mechanics, a fi eld of theoretical physics with no contact with experiments in the 1950s. Experiments in this fi eld came out later. 28 In fact Bohm developed an intense and large scientifi c activity in Brazil. He discussed his proposal with visitors like Richard Feynman, Isidor Rabi, Léon Rosenfeld, Mario Bunge, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Herbert Anderson, Donald Kerst, Marcos Moshinsky, Alejandro Medina, and Guido Beck, and Brazilian physicists Schönberg, Jean Meyer, and Leite Lopes. Bohmʼs work in Brazil gave rise to several publicatons and also collaborations. These involved Vigier, who went to Brazil for three months especially to work with Bohm; the American Ralph Schiller, who had been a student of the 29 Bohm liked Feynmanʼs initial reaction: "At the scientifi c conference at Belo Horizonte, I gave a talk on the quantum theory, which was well received. Feynman was convinced that it is a logical possibility, and that it may lead to something new." Thus to Hanna Loewy: 30 Right now, I am in Rio giving a talk on the quantum theory. About the only person here who really understands is Feynman, and I am gradually winning him over. He already concedes that it is a logical possibility. Also, I am trying to get him out of his depressing trap down long and dreary calculations on a theory [procedures of renormalization in Quantum Field Theory] that is known to be of no use. Instead maybe he can be gotten interested in speculation about new ideas, as he used to do, before Bethe and the rest of the calculations got hold of him.
Bohmʼs hopes were unfounded, since "in his physics Feynman always stayed close to experiments and showed little interest in theories that could not be tested experimentally." The only reference Feynman made to hidden variables as a result of his Brazilian sabbatical was a mention, as a possible avenue for the development of theoretical physics, in a general paper published in a Brazilian science journal. That could scarcely nourish Bohmʼs hopes. 31 More promising support came from Guido Beck, one-time assistant to Heisenberg who had fl ed to Brazil from the Nazis. Beck did not share a belief in the causal interpretation, but defended Bohm against the criticisms of Léon Rosenfeld and insisted Bohm should be encouraged to show what his approach could attain. Beck helped Bohm obtain funding from Brazilʼs national science foundation, the CNPq. 32 The Argentine Mario Bunge, who had Feynman, Beck, Bunge, Vigier, and Schiller were one thing; Rabi, Rosenfeld, and von Weizsäcker quite another: 34 We had an international Congress of Physics....8 physicists from the States (including Wigner, Rabi, Herb, Kerst, and others), 10 from Mexico, Argentina, and Bolivia, aside [a] few from Europe, were brought here by the UNESCO and by the Brazilian National Res. Council….The Americans are clearly very competent in their own fi elds, but very naïve and reactionary in other fi elds….I gave a talk on my hidden variables, but ran into much opposition, especially from Rabi. Most of it made no real sense.
Bohm formulated Rabiʼs view thus: "As yet, your theory is just based on hopes, so why bother us with it until it produces results. The hidden variables are at present analogous to the ʻangelsʼ which people introduced in the Middle Ages to explain things."
Here is Rabiʼs statement of his opinion:
I do not see how the causal interpretation gives us any line to work on other than the use of the concepts of quantum theory. Every time a concept of quantum theory comes along, you can say yes, it would do the same thing as this in the causal interpretation. But I would like to see a situation where the thing turns around, when you predict something and we say, yes, the quantum theory can do it too.
Bohmʼs main answer was a comparison with the debates on atomism in the 19 th century: "[E]xactly the same criticism that you are making was made against the atomic theory-that nobody had seen the atoms, nobody knew what they were like, and the deduction about them was gotten from the perfect gas law, which was already known." But Bohm faced tougher questions than his analogy suggested. How would the model be made relativistic? Anderson wanted to know how Bohm could recover the quantum feature of indiscernibility of particles, i.e., the exclusion principle; Medina asked if Bohmʼs approach could "predict the existence of a spin Rosenfeld was a doctrinaire supporter of complementarity. He wrote, "I certainly shall not enter into any controversy with you or anybody else on the subject of complementarity, for the simple reason that there is not the slightest controversial point about it." Rosenfeld had gone to Brazil to discuss the epistemological problems of quantum mechanics. He offered a course on classical statistical mechanics in Rio de Janeiro, published papers in Portuguese on the epistemological lessons of quantum mechanics, and gave a talk in São Paulo on the non-controversial issue of complementarity. Bohm reported his exchange with Rosenfeld to Aage Bohr: "Prof. Rosenfeld visited Brazil recently, and we had a rather hot and extended discussion in São Paulo, following a seminar that he gave on the foundations of the quantum theory. However, I think that we both learned something from the seminar. Rosenfeld admitted to me afterwards that he could at least see that my point of view was a possible one, although he personally did not to prove that under certain general conditions any function could become a solution of the Schrödinger equation. To get that result, they used an analogy between Bohmʼs approach and the hydrodynamic model suggested by Erwin Madelung in 1926, which embedded microscopic quantum particles in a subquantum medium with random fl uctuations. 42 Thus, the "molecular chaos" that Bohm had abandoned after his discussions with Pauli came back in his work with Vigier. With Tiomno and Schiller, Bohm included spin in his model, although via analogy with Pauliʼs equation and not relativity. 43 Bohm and Vigier modeled elementary particles as extended bodies in space-time, associating their degrees of freedom with quantum numbers in an effort to classify for the myriad newly discovered particles. Their paper, published some years later, 44 began a lasting collaboration among Bohm, Vigier, de Broglie, and their associates. 45 With Walter Schützer, Bohm worked on a study of the role of probability in physical theories. 46 He discussed the same issue with Jean Meyer. In Causality and chance in modern physics, written during Bohmʼs stay in Brazil but only published in 1957, he conceived of causal and probabilistic descriptions as possibilities with the same philosophical rank. This revaluation moved him far from his initial fi xation on causal description, an intellectual shift that would appear more clearly in his ideas of the 1970s.
The collaboration between Bohm and Vigier was abetted by an irony typical of the Cold War. Had Bohm remained in the U.S., Vigier might not have been able to visit him. Vigier, too was a communist. Before becoming one of the most active spokesmen for the causal program, had made a name in the Communist Party in France. As Jessica Wang has pointed out in writing about the "age of anxiety" in American history, "in addition to refusing passports to American scientists, the State Department also restricted the entry of foreign scientists with left-wing political ties into the United States….Scientists from France, where the Left was particularly strong, he had an especially hard time. As much as 70 to 80 percent of visa requests from French scientists were unduly delayed or refused."
47 A main fruit of the collaboration of the two communists was to return the stanchly conservative de Broglie to his search for a deterministic quantum mechanics. As a Nobel Prize winner and one of the founding fathers of wave 42 Bohm made much of the French work, no doubt in part because of Vigierʼs Marxist engagement: "I have heard from someone that in a debate on causality given in Paris, when our friend Vigier got up to defend causality, he was strongly cheered by the audience (which contained a great many students). I would guess that many of the younger people in Europe recognize that the question of causality has important implications in politics, economy, sociology, etc." 50 The connection appeared so obvious to Bohm that he complained when fellow travelers like Philip Morrison did not support him. And he wondered why the causal interpretation had appeared in the West and not in the USSR and why Soviet physicists did not join him.
51
Reception of the interpreter
Bohm arrived in Brazil at a propitious time for Brazilian physics. Cesare Lattes had participated in the discovery, in 1947, of cosmic-ray pions, and, in 1948 the detection of artifi cially produced pions. These achievements resonated in Brazil. An alliance among scientists, the military, businessmen, and politicians developed that aimed to strengthen physics in Brazil. This alliance led to the creation of the Centro Brasileiro de Pesquisas Físicas [CBPF] and, in the same year that Bohm arrived in Brazil, to the creation of the fi rst federal agency exclusively dedicated to funding scientifi c research, the CNPq. 52 55 Cr$100,000 for research on cosmic rays by Kurt Sitte as well as an air ticket for him and his family plus Cr$180,000 to augment Sitteʼs stipend from USP. 56 Bohm also won grants for his students Abrahão Zimmerman, Ruth Pereira da Silva, Paulo Roberto de Paula e Silva, and Klaus Tausk. 57 CNPq also supported the visits of Rosenfeld, Rabi, and von Weizsäcker. 58 Most of the money Bohm received went to research on cosmic rays, a fi eld under Bohmʼs responsibility at USP. Nevertheless, the board of the CNPq explicitly supported the development of the causal interpretation. An indication of the interest of CNPq in the research appears from the report of Joquim Costa Ribeiro, the Scientifi c Director of the agency on Bohmʼs application for funds for Vigier:
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I call the attention of the Board to the interest of this subject. Prof. Bohm is today on the agenda of theoretical physics at an international level owing to his theory, which is a little revolutionary because it intends to restore to quantum mechanics the principle of determinism, which seems, in a certain way, to have been shaken by Heisenbergʼs principle. Prof. Bohm seems to have found one solution to this diffi culty of modern physics, trying to reconcile quantum mechanics with the Since Bohm had not published his causal interpretation it did not fi gure in his candidacy for his position at USP. Once when he came to Brazil, however, support from the CNPq came primarily for his work on it.
Bohmʼs uneasiness in Brazil
Bohmʼs correspondence with Einstein, Pauli, and Phillips, debates in scientifi c journals with Takabayasi, Keller, Epstein, Halpern, and Freistadt, papers by Rosenfeld, Pauli, Born, and Heisenberg, laudatory essays by Schatzman and Freistadt in cultural magazines, and the news Bohm had from Bohr and von Neumann, show that the causal interpretation did not pass unnoticed. 60 Most notices were unfavorable reception. Bohm did not understand this skepticism. Bohmʼs hopes were not modest, "if I can succeed in my general plan, physics can be put back on a basis much nearer to common sense than it has been for a long time." His mood oscillated depending on the reception of his ideas and on the work he had done on them. Thus he could write, "I gave two talks on the subject here, and aroused considerable enthusiasm among people like Tiomno, Schützer, and Leal-Ferreira, who are assistants….Tiomno has been trying to extend the results to the Dirac equation, and has shown some analogy with Einsteinʼs fi eld equations." And again, "I am becoming discouraged also because I lack contact with other people, and feel Schönberg is 100 percent against the causal interpretation, especially against the idea of trying to form a conceptual image of what is happening. He believes that the true dialectical method is to seek a new form of mathematics, the more ʻsubtleʼ the better, and try to solve the crisis in physics in this way. As for explaining chance in terms of causality, he believes this to be "reactionary" and "undialectical." He believes instead that the dialectical approach is to assume "pure chance" which may propagate from level to level, but which is never explained in any way, except in terms of itself.
The attitude of theoretical physicists in Brazil towards Bohmʼs approach resembled that of physicists elsewhere. They all held the Copenhagen interpretation to be the only viable approach to quantum mechanics.
THE RECEPTION OF THE CAUSAL INTERPRETATION
Reaction of the old guard
Mara Beller described "the Copenhagen dogma" as "the rhetoric of fi nality and inevitability." As she wrote, "the founders and followers of the Copenhagen interpretation advocated their philosophy of physics not as a possible interpretation but as the only feasible one." Pauli and Rosenfeld were the fi rst to react; Pauli concentrated on the physical and epistemological aspects, Rosenfeld on the philosophical and ideological ones. As Rosenfeld explained his strategy to Pauli, "My own contribution to the anniversary volume [for de Broglie] has a different character. I deliberately put the discussion on the philosophical ground, because it seems to me that the root of evil is there rather than in physics." After Bohmʼs papers appeared in print, Pauli advanced new criticisms, which surprised Bohm: "I am surprised that Pauli has had the nerve to publicly come out in favor of such nonsense….I certainly hope that he publishes his stuff, as it is so full of inconsistencies and errors that I can attack him from several different directions at once." Pauli had criticized the causal interpretation for not preserving the symmetry between position and momentum representations, expressed in the standard formalism by the theory of unitary transformations. And, as we know, he had objected that Bohm had borrowed the meaning of Ψ from the quantum theory. In a letter to Markus Fierz, Pauli raised the stakes. He observed that Catholics and Communists depended on determinism to buttress their eschatological faiths, the former in the heaven to come, the latter in the terrestrial paradise. Pauli also warned his old friend. Giuseppe Occhialini, who had worked at USP during the 1930s and continued scientifi c collaboration there after the war, against "Bohm in São Paulo and his ʻcausalʼ quantum theory." 64 For Rosenfeld, complementarity was both a direct result of experience and an essential part of quantum theory. 65 Since complementarity implied the abandonment of determinism, Rosenfeld saw the causal interpretation as a metaphysical mark, "Determinism has not escaped this fate [becoming an obstacle to progress]; the physicist who still clings to it, who shuts his eyes to the evidence of complementarity, exchanges (whether he likes it or not) the rational attitude of the scientist for that of the metaphysician." Every good Marxist should understand that. "The latter, as Engels aptly describes him, considers things ʻin isolation, the one after the other and the one without the other,ʼ as if they were ʻfi xed, rigid, given once for all.ʼ" 66 Most of Rosenfi eldʼs work as Bohrʼs assistant was related to epistemological matters and Rosenfeldʼs brand of Marxism the Western Marxism rather than the Soviet variety, to use the terms introduced by Perry Anderson. 67 Rosenfeld believed that complementarity was a dialectical achievement that had to be defended not only against Bohmʼs criticisms but also against Soviet critics who blamed it for introducing idealism in physics. 68 Rosenfeld was orthodox in quantum mechanics and heterodox in Marxism.
Rosenfeld mobilized colleagues wherever he could to take up the fi ght. He pushed Frédéric Joliot-Curie-a Nobel prize winner and member of the French Communist Party-to oppose French Marxist critics of complementarity; 69 advised Pauline Yates-Secretary of the "Society for cultural relations between the peoples of the British Commonwealth and the USSR"-to withdraw from Nature her translation of a paper by Yakov Ilich Frenkel critical of complementarity; 70 asked Nature not to publish a paper by Bohm entitled "A causal and continuous interpretation of the quantum theory;" 71 and advised publishers not to translate into English one of de Broglieʼs books dedicated to the causal interpretation. 72 Rosenfeldʼs correspondence shows that his campaign had wide support.
73 Denis Gabor wrote, "I was much amused by the onslaught on David Bohm, with whom I had a long discussion on this subject in New York, in Sept. 51. Half a dozen of the most eminent scientists have got their knife into him. Great honour for somebody Rosenfeld, Pauli, Heisenberg, and Born built a common front against the causal interpretation, but disagreed, usually in private, over tactics. Rosenfeld criticized Heisenberg probably of leaning towards idealism. Pauli and Born privately criticized Rosenfeldʼs mixture of Marxism with complementarity; as part of their debate, Max Born sent Rosenfeld a ten-page typed text arguing that dialectical materialism could not be corroborated by reference to just one achievement of contemporary science. Born abandoned the idea of publishing the text in the atmosphere of détente between West and East in the late 1950s. Acting as editor of a volume in honor of Bohr, Pauli prevented Rosenfeld, whom he labeled "√BohrxTrotzky," from adorning his paper with banalities on Materialism.
83
The label of "philosophical controversy"
Pauliʼs substantive attack on Bohmʼs approach rested on several assertions: Since it does not have "any effects on observable phenomena, neither directly nor indirectly…the artifi cial asymmetry introduced in the treatment of the two variables of a canonically conjugated pair characterizes this form of theory as artifi cial metaphysics." [If the] "new parameters could give rise to empirically visible effects…. they will be in disagreement with the general character of our experiences, [and] in this case this type of theory loses its physical sense." 84 Rosenfeld minus rhetoric came to this: "I intentionally confi ne the debate to the fi eld of epistemology, for the crucial issue is one of logic, not of physics….Bohmʼs argument is very cleverly contrived. One would look in vain for any weakness in its formal construction." 85 Heisenberg condemned causal interpretations as "ideological."
86 Bohr and Born always emphasized the epistemological nature of the choices related to interpreting the quantum formalism.
Consequently, physicists in the early 1950s saw the controversy as a strictly philosophical dispute concerning ontology (the constitution of the microsystem as waves or/and particles) and epistemology (the status of determinism in physical theories, the completeness of theories, the role of the space-time description). They often used "metaphysical" to characterize disputes without implications for the development of physics. Even physicists who tried to present the controversy impartially shared this view. For example, Albert Messiahʼs infl uential textbook, fi rst published in 1958, taught that "the controversy has fi nally reached a point where it can no longer be decided by any further experimental observations; it henceforth belongs to the philosophy of science rather than to the domain of physical science proper." 87 Similarly Fritz Bopp spoke for many in characterizing a conference dedicated in 1957 to foundational problems in quantum mechanics: "what we have done today was predict the possible development of physics-we were not doing physics but metaphysics." 88 The main result Bohm and his collaborators obtained was the empirical equivalence with nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. They searched in vain for predictions not foreseen by the usual quantum mechanics and also failed to fi nd a satisfactory relativistic generalization of their approach. 89 The absence of new results reinforced the derogatory label of "philosophical" stuck on them by their opponents. This label was damaging as it put off young physicists. A career in physics is not a career in philosophy. The label Vigier chose-"illustrative of dialectical materialism" 90 -appealed to Marxist physicists, but effective as it was in the 1950s, could not sustain a research program.
The working of a monocracy-quantum mechanics training and research agenda
Max Jammer referred to the "almost unchallenged monocracy of the Copenhagen school in the philosophy of quantum mechanics." John Heilbron, discussing the fi rst missionaries of the Copenhagen, showed that beyond Bohrʼs close circle (Heisenberg, Pauli, Jordan, Born, Rosenfeld) and their brilliant opponents (Einstein, Schrödinger), physicists did not consciously adhere to complementarity or criticize 87. Albert Messiah, Quantum mechanics (Amsterdam, 1964), Vol. 1, 48. However, he did not please the hard core of the supporters of the Copenhagen interpretation. Rosenfeld wrote to him praising the book, but in disagreement with his diagnosis of the controversy. For Rosenfeld, "Ce nʼest pas en effet dʼexpérience, mais bien de simple logique quʼil sʼagit ici." Léon Rosenfeld to Albert Messiah, 16 Jan 1959, RP. 88. Bopp, in Stephan Körner, ed., Observation and interpretation in the philosophy of physics, with special reference to quantum mechanics (New York, 1957), 51. By the way, Bopp was working on another alternative interpretation, the so-called "stochastic interpretation." 89. My previous writings on Bohmʼs case overestimated these aspects, since they were not put in the broader context that I am discussing in this paper. Two examples of casual interpretation supporters disenchanted with such results are Mario Bunge and Philippe Leruste. it, but rather used the quantum machinery to scrutinize the microscopic world. Heilbron also suggested that the philosophical fl avor of Bohrʼs views on the interpretation of quantum mechanics contributed to American and British indifference to complementarity. 91 Sam Schweber added two American peculiarities, both of them hostile to philosophizing about quantum mechanics: the placing of theoretical and experimental physicists in the same departments, and American trends toward pragmatism. 92 Analyzing how American physicists reacted in the 1920s to the philosophical problems of quantum theory, Nancy Cartwright observed: "Americans in general had little anxiety about the metaphysical implications of the quantum theory; and their attitude was entirely rational given the operationalist-pragmatist-style philosophy that a good many of them shared." 93 These characteristics intensifi ed after World War II. According to David Kaiser, "the pedagogical requirements entailed by the sudden exponential growth in graduate student numbers during the cold war reinforced a particular instrumentalist approach to physics." In this context, Kaiser continues, "epistemological musings or the striving for ultimate theoretical foundations-never a strong interest among American physicists even before the war-fell beyond the pale for the postwar generation and their advisors." 94 The textbooks from which physicists learned quantum mechanics until the 1950s did not "refl ect much concern at all about the interpretation of the theory." 95 According to Helge Kragh, "most textbook authors, even if sympathetic to Bohrʼs ideas, found it diffi cult to include and justify a section on complementarity. Among forty-three textbooks on quantum mechanics published between 1928 and 1937, forty included a treatment of the uncertainty principle; only eight of them mentioned the complementarity principle." 96 Bohrʼs epistemological writings were circulated in papers presented in scientifi c meetings and printed in anthologies, not textbooks.
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That worried Rosenfeld. "There is not a single textbook of quantum mechanics in any language in which the principles of this fundamental discipline are adequately treated, with proper consideration of the role of measurements to defi ne the use of classical concepts in the quantal description….there is thus most obviously an urgent need for a good elementary treatise….But it will be extremely diffi cult to fi nd an author for such a book: those who have the competence to write it are too busy with other problems." 98 He urged Bohr to do it, "There is great interest in the topic among chemists and biologists, but there is no book that one can refer them to and that could protect them from the confusion created by Bohm, Landé, and other dilettantes. I will now do my bit here in Manchester by giving a lecture for chemists and biologists; but nothing can replace the book that you must write." 99 The absence of foundational issues from the textbooks, ultimately ran against complementarity. As the number of people interested in such issues grew, especially in the 1960s, ignorance of complementarity eased the way for its critics.
100
A "fi eld of struggles to conserve or transform this fi eld of forces"
101
In a well argued paper of 1977, Trevor Pinch used Pierre Bourdieuʼs sociological concept of "scientifi c fi eld" to argue that Bohm had successfully followed a "succession strategy" before 1952 (accumulating symbolic capital), and had then switched to a "subversion strategy" with the publication of his heterodox paper on "hidden variables." Pinch doubted whether Bohmʼs strategy of publishing an "interpretation" had been advisable; he might have foreseen the "conservationist strategy" of the "elite" of quantum physics. As he wrote, 102 97. Thomas Kuhn, The structure of the scientifi c revolutions (Chicago, 1970) . 98. Léon Rosenfeld, "Report on L. de Broglie" (ref. 72). The report follows: "The nearest to a really good treatment is found in Landau and Lifschitzʼs outstanding treatise: but it is too short and not explicit enough to be a real help to the student. The only books which are purposely devoted to an exposition of the principles are v. Neumannʼs aforementioned treatise and a little book by Heisenberg: the fi rst is (as stated above) misleading in several respects, the second is too sketchy and on the subject of measurements it even contains serious errors (however surprising this may appear, the author being one of the founders of the theory). As to Bohrʼs authoritative article, it is in fact only accessible to fully trained specialists and too diffi cult to serve as an introduction into this question. The attacks on Bohm by the quantum elite can be regarded as part of what Bourdieu calls the conservationist strategy to be followed by the elite to ensure continual return on their investments. Bohm, by advocating a heterodox interpretation, was challenging the eliteʼs authority by questioning the legitimacy of their previous investments in the interpretation of quantum theory. The offi cial-history mode articulation of von Neumannʼs proof can be regarded then as an attempt to maintain a particular authority structure.
Although Pinch directed a few words to Pauli and Rosenfeld, stating that their criticisms are "along the metaphysical dimension of scientifi c activity and do not involve the construction of a specifi c cognitive object onto which the dispute could crystallize," most of his analysis concerned the symbolic role of von Neumannʼs proof. But that focus is too narrow to catch all the monopolies Bohm was challenging with his "subversion strategy."
103 Von Neumannʼs proof did not play a role in the arguments by Rosenfeld, Pauli, and Heisenberg, nor in the skepticism of physicists like Feynman, Beck, and Leite Lopes. The investment in the idea that complementarity had solved the foundational problems of quantum mechanics was larger than the investment in von Neumannʼs proof, and defended with more determination.
Von Neumann did not publish any paper criticizing the causal interpretation. Bohm reported that "von Neumann thinks my work correct, and even ʻelegant,ʼ but he expects diffi culties in extending it to spin."
104 Von Neumann probably interested himself in Bohmʼs work in the 1950s while revising the English translation of his Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik (1932) , in which his famous proof appeared. To his publisher, he explained the diffi culties, "the text had to be extensively rewritten, because a literal translation from German to English is entirely out of question in the fi eld of this book. The subject-matter is partly physical-mathematical, partly, however, a very involved conceptual critique of the logical foundations of various disciplines….This philosophical-epistemological discussion has to be continuously tied in and quite critically synchronized with the parallel mathematical-physical discussion." Michael Stöltzner has recently given a plausible account of von Neumannʼs criteria for the success of physical theory that suggests how he might have evaluated Pauli and Stöltzner judged that von Neumann was the most conciliatory reaction to [Bohmʼs interpretation] among the fathers of the ʻCopenhagen interpretation.ʼ" Had Bohm remained in Princeton, he and von Neumann might have had productive discussions.
Catherine Chevalley convincingly argued that one cannot understand Bohrʼs refl ections independent of their context which related, on one hand, to the "history of atomic physics," and, on the other, to the "history of a philosophical tradition widely different in content from either logical positivism or Lebensphilosophie." Chevalley remarked that "the term ʻCopenhagen interpretationʼ appear [ed] only in the mid-1950ʼs in the context of hidden-variables and Marxist materialism." This led her to conjecture that Bohrʼs thoughts were distorted and assimilated to a term whose exact content has been the object of wide disagreement. Chevalley also remarked that the fi rst to use the term "Copenhagen school" was, among critics, the Soviet physicist Blokhinzev and, among supporters, Heisenberg.
106 Rosenfeld criticized Heisenberg for the usage: the label might induce people to admit the existence of other interpretations. Heisenberg conceded the point:
107
I avow that the term "Copenhagen interpretation" is not happy since it could suggest that there are other interpretations, like Bohm assumes. We agree, of course, that the other interpretations are nonsense, and I believe that this is clear in my book [Physics and Philosophy] , and in previous papers. Anyway, I cannot now, unfortunately, change the book since the printing began enough time ago.
The term "Copenhagen school" fi rst became current in the 1950s. The battles of that decade affected the causal interpretation, isolating it among physicists, and also the standard interpretation, distorting the views of the founding fathers. 109 Here the saga of Hugh Everett III provides a useful comparison. Everett wrote a thesis at Princeton and, also like Bohm, produced an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics that was equally poorly received in its fi rst ten years and later revived. Differently from Bohm, however, Everett did not have to face McCarthyism or exile. 110 Everett argued the need for a new interpretation for quantum theory in order to meet the challenge of quantizing general relativity. He remarked that quantum mechanics is incomparable with the idea of a closed universe, a concept essential for cosmologists, since "the whole interpretive scheme of [its[ formalism rests upon the notion of external observation." Von Neumannʼs presentation of quantum theory rests on the axiomatic distinction between two processes of evolution of the quantum states: one is discontinuous and not ruled by the Schrödinger equation, and happens during observations; the other is the deterministic change of an isolated system, governed by the Schrödinger equation, which takes place in the absence of measurements. Everett dispensed with the fi rst of von Neumannʼs processes and pushed to its ultimate consequences a quantum treatment based exclusively on the second process. Everett considered the measuring device as a subsystem subject to quantum mechanics. This argument was in line with von Neumannʼs mathematical approach but far from Bohrʼs insistence that laboratory apparatus should be treated according to classical physics. Everettʼs tour de force was to at-tribute physical reality to an ever branching universe, each branch being the state of a subsystem plus the related state of the whole system, at a moment immediately after each physical interaction. Even though this scheme is far from intuitive, it is not logically inconsistent, "since all the separate elements of a superposition individually obey the wave equation with complete indifference to the presence or absence ("actually" or not) of any other elements." Our common-sense intuition is preserved because "this total lack of effect of one branch on another also implies that no observer will ever be aware of any ʻsplittingʼ process." 111 Everett recommended his approach as "a metatheory for the standard theory," and described its advantages in dealing with "imperfect observations and approximate measurement" and approaching "quantization of general relativity." Nonetheless, heresy is heresy and Everett emphasized his distance from Bohrʼs epistemological considerations: "The particular diffi culties with quantum mechanics that are discussed in my paper have mostly to do with the more common (at least in this country) form of quantum theory, as expressed, for example, by von Neumann, and not so much with the Bohr (Copenhagen) interpretation. The Bohr interpretation is to me even more unsatisfactory, and on quite different grounds." Everett in effect combined Bohmʼs realism and von Neumannʼs quantum treatment of measuring devices. Everettʼs dissertation put Wheeler in a quandary. He early approved the physico-mathematical scheme, "the correlation [paper] seems to me practically ready to publish," but he disliked Everettʼs epistemological considerations, which included a section on the different interpretations of quantum mechanics. "I am frankly bashful about showing it to Bohr in its present form, valuable and important as I consider it to be; because of parts subject to mystical misinterpretations by too many unskilled readers." As a follower of Bohr, Wheeler could not accept Everettʼs rejection of complementarity. 112 Wheeler had the idea of convincing Bohr of the value of Everettʼs approach and persuading Everett to remove the offensive epistemological considerations from his dissertation. He hoped thereby to arrange for the publication of Everettʼs dissertation in full by the Danish Academy of Sciences which would legitimize it among the supporters of complementarity. 113 [Everettʼs] work suffers from the fundamental misunderstanding which affects all attempts at "axiomatizing" any part of physics. The "axiomatizers" do not realize that every physical theory must necessarily make use of concepts which cannot, in principle, be further analysed, since they describe the relationship between the physical system which is the object of study and the means of observation by which we study it: these concepts are those by which we give information about the experimental arrangement, enabling anyone (in principle) to repeat the experiment. It is clear that in the last resort we must here appeal to common experience as a basis for common understanding. To try (as Everett does) to include the experimental arrangement into the theoretical formalism is perfectly hopeless, since this can only shift, but never remove, this essential use of unanalysed concepts which alone makes the theory intelligible and communicable.
Wheeler did not surrender. He recommended approval of the dissertation and a stay for Everett in Copenhagen. The dissertation was duly approved in 1957 and published abridged in a special issue of Reviews of modern physics, along with the proceedings of a conference that Everett had not attended and a note by Wheeler about the possible convergence between Everettʼs ideas and complementarity. Everett went to Copenhagen in 1959, but the discussions with Bohr bore no fruit. Disillusioned with the whole affair and satisfi ed with his work on game theory and computers for the Pentagon, Everett abandoned physics. He never again wrote on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, even when his ideas were revived by others ten years. During its fi rst decade in print, his paper received no more than 20 citations. 115 Blocked by the Copenhagen monocracy Everettʼs ideas had a fate similar to Bohm. But Everett did not face the political harassment that Bohm endured. Rather than suffer, Everett had a good job at the Pentagon when his "relative states" interpretation of quantum mechanics suffered unfavorable reception. Once again McCarthyism does not appear as the major obstacle to the acceptance of Bohmʼs physics. 
THE RUSE OF HISTORY
The monocratic Copenhagen school divided during the 1960s over a dispute between Wigner and Rosenfeld about the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. One fraction remains with Bohr; the other, the Princeton school, roughly centered on von Neumann and Wigner. Research on the foundations of quantum mechanics fl ourished in the 1970s and the 1980s, especially over issues related to John Bellʼs theorem and the measurement problem. It is an historical irony that the main scientifi c contribution from this fi eld of research-the Bell theorem and experimental tests confi rming quantum mechanical predictions and refuting locality-was motivated by Bohmʼs insistence on hidden variables. Bell owed more to Bohm than is usually recognized. Bell resumed this work at Stanford during a leave of absence from CERN. In the fi rst of two articles on the foundations of quantum mechanics that he published while in the U.S., he acknowledged for "intensive discussion" with Mandl in 1952 and, subsequently, with Professor J.M. Jauch. In a later interview Bohm discussed more fully the origins of the Stanford paper, 117 I had once again begun considering the foundations of quantum mechanics, stimulated by some discussions with one of my colleagues, Josef Jauch. He, it turned out, was actually trying to strengthen von Neumannʼs infamous theorem. For me, that was like a red light to a bull. So I wanted to show that Jauch was wrong. We had gotten into some quite intense discussions. I thought I had located the unreasonable assumption in Jauchʼs work. A few words from the paper published by Jauch and Piron will explain what was at stake: 118 There are several reasons why we propose to re-examine here von Neumannʼs proof again. First of all there seems to be a renewed interest in a critique of the foundations of quantum mechanics and some of the recent attempts in this direction have not always done full justice to von Neumann….Bohm in his book [Causality and chance in modern physics, 1957] even goes so far as to accuse von Neumann of circular reasoning. If this were true, this "proof" would mean, of course, exactly nothing and would leave all doors open for speculations on a "sub-quantum mechanical level" and a "deeper reality" so dear to the abovementioned authors.
Bell accordingly addressed his fi rst paper to those who believe that the "the question concerning the existence of such hidden variables received an early and rather decisive answer in the form of von Neumannʼs proof on the mathematical impossibility of such variables in quantum theory." Bellʼs work therefore falls in the tradition of reinforcing proofs against hidden variables, a tradition that had been challenged by Bohm, de Broglie, and their collaborators. If the possibility of introducing hidden variables in quantum mechanics was Bellʼs motive, his approach differed much from Bohmʼs. He was not interested in building viable models mimicking quantum mechanics; instead, he subjected von Neumannʼs proofs and, later on, also the assumptions behind the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen gedankexperiment, with intense scrutiny. Bellʼs theorem contrasted quantum mechanical predictions with a family of hidden variables that fulfi lled the criterion of locality. This criterion, relevant to Einsteinʼs reasoning, requires that measurement of a property of one of two particles that once interacted does not affect any property of the other after their separation. The Bell theorem is that no local hidden variable theory can recover all quantum mechanical predictions, and the quantitative measurements of this shortfall are the Bell inequalities. These inequalities have motivated a cornucopia of experiments. By arriving at this theorem, Bell had shown both the restrictive assumption in von Neumannʼs proof (the additivity of the expectation values) and why Bohmʼs hidden variables were possible (they were as nonlocal as quantum theory). 119 Independent of its intrinsic merits, which still awake passions, Bohmʼs hidden variables gave him a role in the history of physics comparable to Kepler, who contributed to the creation of modern science while looking for celestial music in the 
